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OCTOBER, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHT.
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitialchange in the
very tissue of the law".-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
NOTES ON MISSOURI CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENTS. Ex parte Keet'
The petitioner, who was convicted of murder in the second degree and whose
punishment was assessed at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for ten years,
made application to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, and assigned as
her grounds the insufficiency of the indictment.2 She contended that the indictment
alleged nothing more than manslaughter, and that, therefore, she was convicted of,
and is imprisoned for, a crime with which she was never charged.
The Court was of the opinion that the indictment "embraces within its allega-
tions every element of murder in the second degree" and that "it describes the offense
with such certainty that the accused was bound to know what she was called upon to
answer, and the court and the jury the issue they were to try, and that a conviction
or acquital could be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution."
1. 315 Mo. 695, 287 S. W. 463.
2. The information upon which *the petitioner
was tried, omitting formal parts, was as follows.--
"0. J. Page, prosecuting attorney within and for the
County of Greene, in the state of Missouri, under his
oath of office informs the court that Arte Keet, late
of the county and state aforesaid, on the 8th day of
June, A. D. 1919, at the county of Greene and state
of Missouri. in and'upon one Minor Kee, then and
there being, feloniously, willfully, premeditatedly, and
of her malice aforethought, did make an assault, and
with a dangerous and deadly weapon, to wit, a revolv_
ing pistol and then and there loaded mith gunpowder
and leaden balls, tahi, she the said Artie Keet, in both
her hands then and there had and held at and against
him, the said Minor Keet, then and there feloniously,
on purpose and of her malice aforethought, willfully
and premeditatedly, did shoot off and discharge, and
with the revolving pistol aforesaid, and leaden balls
aforesaid, then and there feloniously, on purpose and
of her malice aforethought willfully, premeditatedly,
did shoot and strike him the said Artie Keet giving
to him, the said Minor Keet, then and there with a
dangerous weapon aforesaid, the revolving pistol
aforesaid and leaden balls aforesaid, in and upon the
abdomen and bowels of the said Minor Keet, one
mortal wound of the breadth of one inch And of the
depth of twelve inches, of which mortal wounds the
said Minor Keet then and there instantly died; con-
trary to the form of the statute in such cases made
and provided against the peace and dignity of the
state."
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The defect which the petitioner alleged was that the indictment failed to con-
clude with the orthodox formula embraced in common law indictments for murder.3
The petitioner did not assert that as a result of the omission of this formal conclusion
found in ancient precedents her case had been prejudiced in any manner; but, rather,
insisted that such a conclusion is a matter of substance unaffected by the statute of
jeofails.4
This case appears to merit careful consideration. Its effect cannot be confined
to the mere matter of formal conclusions to indictments; the tone of the decision
seems to permeate the whole field of criminal procedure. It is significant to note that
in the face of a long line of decisions committing Missouri as a strict constructionist
of legal phraseology, the Court has now ascribed those former decisions to the "in-
fluence of thoughts and traditions of another generation", and has held that methods
more direct are now needed by the courts.
In the case of State v. Pemberton6 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
the first count of an indictment for murder was bad because it did not conclude with
the words "against the peace and dignity of the state."6
A few years later in the case of State v. Meyers7 an indictment concluding "and,
so said Charles Meyers and John Bog ard, in manner and form aforesaid, and by
the means aforesaid .... " was held to be insufficient because there was not insert-
ed the words "grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say." The Court
in the Meyers case seems to reason that an indictment in Missouri means what an
indictment means at common law and the omission of a word in the prescribed
formula is an alteration in the substance of the indictment. 8 This case of State v.
Meyers was the principal authority relied upon by the petitioner in Exparle Keet. It
seems clear that the changing of the substance of the indictment from that followed
3. The petitioner maintained that the indictment
should conclude as specified in STATE V Rector, 126
Mo. 328, 23 S. W. 1074; which would be:-"And so
the prosecuting attorney aforesaid, upon his official
oath aforesaid, does say, that the said Artie Keet, him,
the said Minor Keet, in manner and form aforesaid,
and by the means aforesaid, did feloniously, willfully,
premeditatedly and of her malice aforethought, kill
and murder, etc."
4. The first statute of jeofails ('jeofails-I have
failed or I am in error) was passed shortly after the
Norman Conquest and has been followed by numer-
ous others. But as late as Blackstone's time none of
them applied to criminal proceedings. By 1821 the
Legislature of Missouri had provided that "-indict-
ments and proceedings in criminal cases maybe amend-
ed in point of form at any time before the jury are
sworn for the trial of the case." This statute was
amended in 1855, 1879, and 1889. Section 3908 R. S
Mo. 1919 provides that "No indictment or informa-
tion shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the trial,
judgment or other proceedings thereon be staid,
arrested or in any manner affected....(by) any other
defect or imperfection which does not tend to the
prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant
upon the merits: Provided, that nothing herein shall
be so construed as to render valid any indictment
which does not fully inform the defendant of the
offense of which he stands charged."
5. 30 Mo. 376 (1860).
6. STATE V PEMBERTON interpreted Article
VI. Sec. 38 of the Constitution of Missouri reading
"and all indictments shall conclude 'against the
peace and dignity of the state' " as mandatory in its
nature; and in deciding whether a plain statement of
the facts and accusations without specifically men-
tioning the term "murder" is enough, held that it
is insufficient and argued that to hold otherwise
would be to put civil and criminal proceedings on
the same footing and allow the prosecution to make,
as in civil proceedings, "a plain and concise state-
ment of the facts" constituting the offense, But it
would seem that it might well be argued that the only
purpose of the pleadings in either criminal or civil ac-
tions is toinform thedefendant with what lie is charg-
ed and the court of the issue to be tried, and that,
therefore, "a plain and concise statement of the facts"
would be enough. Dean Pound, in his report to the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology
said, "A chief object of reform of procedure, both
crim- inal and civil, must be to insure trial and re-
views of the care rather than the record. The present
practice amounts to record-worship."
7. 99 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516 (1889).
8. At common law great strictness and technica
accuracy were exacted as to the conclusion of an in-
dictment for murder, and in some states it is still held
that the conclusion of an indictment for murder
distinguishes it from an indictment for manslaughter,
the previous words without the conclusion being
insufficient to charge murder. 30 C. J. 117
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in common law indictments would be contrary to the Constitution.9 However, the
wide divergence of opinion comes in determining what is substance; and the recent
decisions seem to be getting away from the literal interpretation given in State r.
Meyers.10
Perhaps the most outstanding of the older cases which attempts to limit sub-
stance to literalism is State v. Campbell," the celebrated "The" case, in which an
indictment concluding "against the peace and dignity of state" was held insufficient
because of the omission of the word "the" before "state". The opinion said, "While
it may be conceded that the word "the" preceding the word "state" is a small one
and in many instances of little importance ..... we see no escape from the conclusion
that the definite article "the" preceding the word "state" is absolutely necessary
in order to designate the particular state against which the offense is charged to have
been committed." And again, " 'the state' in the conclusion prescribed by the Con-
stitution of this State means the State of Missouri ....." It would seem to require a
rather vivid imagination to conceive of a situation in which the defendant, who had
committed rape in the State of Missouri, could have any misgivings as to the par-
ticular state against whose laws he had offended; or, again, a situation in which the
defendant'slawyer had any doubt as to the state referred to in the indictment. It
seems that the Court in this instance defined substance in terms of sentence structure.
Numerous cases have been decided in Missouri in which a strict observance
of technical accuracy was insisted upon. For example, an indictment charging that
the defendant fired a pistol "thereby and thus striking" the deceased, was held bad
because the words "thereby and thus striking" indicated that the indictment
had previously alleged a "shooting and wounding", when, in fact, it had not.'-
Again, an indictment for murder was declared fatally defective because the word
"weapon" was misspelled so as to read "neapon". 3 Likewise, an indictment
which alleged that "some heavy weapon or instrument.., did forcibly strike and
beat" was held insufficient because of the omission of the word "with". 14
More recently, however, the Court has shown a decided tendency to get away
from formalism and technicalities, and to disregard such minor errors or imper-
fections in indictments and informations as do not prejudice the rights of the accused
or prevent a fair determination of the issues involved. In the case of State V. Eransn
the Court grew noticeably liberal, as compared with its previous attitude, and
held an indictment concluding "and so the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid"
etc. was not defective because of the omission of "Grand" before "jurors".
9. In view of our statute of jeofails it would
seem that an indictment in Missouri means what an
indictment meant at common law only so far as
substance is concerned. The statute evidently abolish-
ed the necessity of consistency in mere form. See
R. S. Mo. 1919 Section 3853.
10. However, STATE V. MEYERS has been
followed in many cases, including STATE V. FERGU-
SON, (1899), 152 Mo. 98, 53 S. W. 427; STATE V.
SANDERS,(1900), 158 Mo. 610,59 S. W.993; STATE
V. COOK, (1902), 170 Mo. 210, 70 S W. 483; STATE
V. DAWSON, (1905), 187 Mo. 60, 85 S. W. 526;
STATE V. MINOR, (1906), 193 Mo. 599, 92 S. W.
466.
11. (1908) 210 Mo. 202, 109 S. W. 706.
12. STATE V GREEN, (1892), Ill Mo. 585, 20
S. W. 304.
13. STATE V. FAIRLAMB, (1894), 121 Mo.
137, 2S S. W. 895. This case was partially overruled
in STATE V. HASCALL, 284 Mo. 607.226S. %1.18.
14. STATE V. RECTOR, (1894). 126 Mto. 328,
23 S. IV. 1074. The case was overruled by STATE
V. BAIRD, (1923). 297 Mo. 219. 248 S. 11. 597,
which held that the omission of "with" does not
invalidate the indictment. STATE V. JONES, (1896)
134 Mo. 259, 35 S. IV. 607, held that an indictment
otherwise sufficient is not defective because the con
clusion commences "And the grand jury aforesaid up-
on their oath aforesaid, do say---" instead of
"And so the grandjury aforesaid ete." STATE V.
GLEASON, (1903), 172 Mo. 279, 72 S. W. 676, held
that the adding of the words "of .Mhisuri" was only
surplusage and did not make the indictment bad, and
STATE V REAKEY, (1876), 1 Mo. A. 3. held that an
alteration might be surplusage and not affect the va-
lidity of the indictment.
15. (1895), 128 Mo. 406, 31 5. V. 34.
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An information was held good in State v. Borderslu even though it did not state
the place where the deceased died. In State v. Webb"7 the Court held that the fact that
the deceased received a wound in the head instead of the body as alleged, was not
sufficient to defeat the indictment. And in State v. Flanneryis the Court held that
misspelling the name of the deceased did not render the indictment defective. In this
latter case, the Court said, "Courts should not lend themselves to subterfuges as
defenses to criminal prosecution where not even an intimation of prejudice is made.
The time has passed, not only in this state but elsewhere, when pure technicalities,
in the absence of evidence of well defined injury to the accused, will be permitted to
obstruct the enforcement of the criminal law."
Perhaps one of the best statements of the modern attitude of the Missouri Court
is found in State v. Hascalg in which the Court said, "While it is true in a criminal
charge that nothing must be left to intendment or implication, this rule must be con-
strued as having reference to such allegations as are necessary to inform the defendant
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and not extrinsic matter,
the averment of which is unnecessary, and if averred, need not be proved."
When the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court in the principal case, she
did not argue that she had not committed the act of killing; but in so many words
argued that the conviction should be set aside because the grand jury forgot to say
"hocus pocus". Mr. Justice Ragland in his able opinion intimates that such anti-
quated procedural objections are the outgrowth of English legislative enactments
which could not possibly have any justification in this country. He says, "It is a
mere form, without life or substance, which we have been idolatroulsy following." 20
It seems that the necessity of distinguishing in the formal conclusion to the indict-
ment as here contended for between murder and manslaughter arose in the English
statute affecting "benefit of clergy". According to this statute, one who was convicted
of "wilful murder" was deprived of the benefit of clergy, and in order to bring a case
within the statute it was deemed necessary to use in the indictment the language of
the statute itself. It would seem that it is indeed a timely opinion which observes
that the Meyers case and those concurring decisions adhering to this English tradi-
tion "should no longer be followed" and that "Methods more direct and involving less
of circumlocution than were then employed are now demanded in all the activities of life."2 1
Dean Pound of Harvard tells us, "Our criminal procedure still suffers from tile
astuteness of judges in the past to avoid convictions at a time when all felonies
were punishable with death."' ' This seems to furnish an answer to the question
whether procedural technicalities are necessary to protect the innocent. It seems
that these technicalities were never initiated to protect the innocent, but rather to
save the obviously guilty from a punishment made too severe by legislative enact-
ment. The English courts of that period recognized that justice could not then be
done by declaring the guilty guilty; and the court, lawyers, and the accused seemed
16. 199 S. W. 180. substantially responded to in this part (conclusion)
17. (1914), 254 Mo. 414, 162 S. W. 622. of the indictment, a literal transcript of the formula
18. (1915), 263 Mo. 1. c. 579, 173 S. W. 1053: is not essential."
19. (1920), 284 Mo. 607, 226, S. W. 18. 21. Mr. Justice Ragland, in his opinion In Ex.
20 STATEV. SCHLOSS, 93Mo. 361,6S.W. 244. parte KEET quotes at length from ANDERSON V
held that when the indictment embraces the words in STATE, S Ark. 444, an opinion handed down by the
the Constitution but also adds "contrary to the form Supreme Court of Arkansas over a hundred years
of the statute" the conclusion embraces the language ago, which, in exploding the literalists' theories, gives
designated by the Constitution and the additional an excellent historical review of the conditions leading
words are only surplusage. And the Court in STATE the courts to favor the use of technicalities.
V WATERS, 1 Mo. A. 7, concludes that "the general 22. See page 582 of Pound's Criminal Justice In
doctrine is that if the intent of the Constitution be Cleveland.
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to have entered into a "humane conspiracy" to evoke every conceivable technicality
to prevent conviction, when a minor offense meant death. However, England soon
found it unnecessary to continue this practice, and we find Lord Hale warning the
English courts, "And it were very fit that by some law this overgrown curiosity and
nicety were reformed, which has now become the disease of the law, and will, I fear
in time grow mortal without some timely remedy."23 England long ago abolished
trial by technicality; but many of the United States courts have jealously guarded
the old practice as a protection to the innocent.2' But as Mr. Justice Holmes has
said, "There is much more danger today that criminals will escape justice than that
they will be subjected to tyranny."25
Conditions have changed, but many courts continue to allow the obviously
guilty to take advantage of technical and unimportant mistakes in the indictment.
And with what result? -4 practice which had a praiseworthy origin in the English
judiciary's effort to promote justice, is being so perverted and misapplied that it is now
defeating the very purpose for which it was established. A rule which has outlived its
usefulness should no longer be followed.
The late Governor Herbert S. Hadley said, "The effect of a technical adminis-
tration of law is to develop what is known as the sporting theory of justice.'" Too
often our criminal trials are not honest efforts to discover whether the accused com-
mitted the crime; but rather a fencing of skillful lawyers, not concerned with the
innocence or guilt of the defendant, but interested in discovering some technical
defect which will be held to be reversible error.-" A century ago it was the custom in
England to allow a defendant to prove his innocence by challenging his accuser toopen
battle2. Our generation has retained its sporting instincts; but a less virile age
seems too often to have reduced a criminal trial to an indoor sport in which duel-
ing weapons have been replaced by the procedural astuteness of the attorneys. 2
Again quoting Governor Hadley: ....... the principal influence which makes for an
ineffective administration of justice, in my opinion, is a cumbersome, archaic and
ineffective system of criminal procedure with the glorification of technicality
and formalism which it fosters and maintains."' 0
The public has objected to the repeated miscarriages of justice; and the public
23. 2 Hale 193, page 131 of Kelley's Criminal Law
and Practice (3rd Ed.).
24. "- .... in England to a greater extent than
in the United States the trial of a criminal case is re-
garded by all connected with the case solely as an
investigation to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the
accused ---- " Defects in Criminal Justice 11 Am.
Bar Assn. J. 297, 301.
"There is no filibustering in trials over there ------
They try the defendant and not the complaining
witness or some other witness or the prosecuting at-
torney." Ibid. 30.
"The most noticeable feature of the English courts
and procedure is their freedom to accomplish justice."
Reid's, English Criminal Trials of Today, 10 .Mar-
quette L. Rev. 27, 29.
25. 26 Col. Law Rev. 253, 262, Frank H. His-
cock's Criminal Law and Procedure in New York.
26. 11 Am. Bar Assn. J. 674, 678, Present Con-
ditions Historically Considered. See also: 1 J. of Crim.
Law and Criminology 63. Lawcon's Technicalities in
Procedure.
27. Our system "leads to exertion to get error into
the record rather than to dispose of the controversy
finally and unon its merits." Pound's, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction With The Administration of
Justice, 29 Reports of Am. Bar Assn. 395.
28. See ASHFORD VTHORNTON, (1818). 1B.
& Aid. 405, in which the prosecution was stopped be-
cause the prosecuting witness declined to accept a
challenge to do battle.
29. "The idea that prodecure must of necessity
be wholly contentious disfigures our judicial admin-
istration at every point--..- Itleads counsel -----
to deal with rules of law and procedure exactly as the
professional football coach with the rules of the
sport--..---
11 Am Bar Assn. J. 674.
30. 11 Am. Bar Assn J. 674, 675.
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has a right to object. 31 What need has an innocent man of an absurd technicality
to emphasize his innocence? Criminal procedure "with a few notable exceptions in
one or two localities...remains what it was fifty years ago."32 Many members of the
legal profession have consoled themselves by saying that the public cannot appre-
ciate the necessity of adhering strictly to the prescribed form in the indictment, but
without doubt the Missouri Supreme Court has greatly improved procedure in this
state by announcing that it, too, can no longer appreciate the necessity of adhering
to the prescribed form.
The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accus-
ed. As long as the substance of the indictment is not altered, no unfair advantage
can be taken of the defendant by allowing the substitution of one word for another;
nor can any legitimate advantage be preserved to him by worshiping form. It is
interesting to note that at one time it was the style in England to allege that the
defendant committed the act "not having the fear of God before his eyes, but
being moved and seduced by the instigations of the devil."' 33  Lord Mansfield
disregarded such phrases as "saying nothing". This seems, in Ex parte KEET, to
be the position of the Missouri Supreme Court: The magic formula which the petition-
er insisted upon was only a rhetorical flourish saying nothing. The court carefully
states that the decision in Ex parte KEET does not affect the substance of the in-
dictment. 34 The petitioner's constitutional right to have the indictment conform in
substance to a common law indictment is carefully preserved; but the petitioner's
desire to have the indictment conform in grammatical syntax to a common law
indictment is denied. The logic of this position is very aptly alluded to in State v.
Glass,36 a case decided since Exparte KEET. The Court concluded that "this formal
sonorous conclusion was a part of the habiliments of the charge, and performed
the same office for the indictment that judicial robes perform for the judges, invest-
ing them with apparent authority, but adding nothing to the weight and soundness
of their judgment".36
Some recent attempts to secure legislative reform in criminal procedure in
Missouri proved unavailing. No far reaching changes may be looked for, probably,
in the near future. Until such time as the legislature sees fit to make the needed re-
forms, the courts can serve the cause of criminal justice by refusing to set aside
convictions for mere technical errors, not going to substance. Ex parte Keet is a
step forward.
J. P. B.
31. Chief Justice Taft has frequently stated in his 34. "We would not be understood as departing
public addresses that our system of procedure in in the least from our former rulings that in this state
criminal cases has practically broken down of its own an indictment means just what it did at common
burden of technicalities and that administration of law ---- in so far as substance is concerned." Ex.
the criminal law in practically all the states "is a parte Keet, 315 Mo. L C. 701.
disgrace to our civilization". Charles R. Holdeh's 35. 300 S. W. 691 (Mo.)
Public Interest in Crime presents an able discussion 36. In STATE V FOX, (1927),300 S.W. 820, theof this point.
32. See Pound's "Problems of Law." court answers the argument of counsel with respect
to formal conclusions to indictments by saying, "But33. Bishop's New Crim. Proc. Vol 1. Pg. 314, that view was exploded in Ex parte KEET."
taken from Wonders of the Invisible World, Loud
ed. of 1862; p. 54
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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. FAILURE OF MOTORIST TO STOP,
LOOK AND LISTEN BEFORE CR9SSING RAILROAD.
In Flanagan v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,' a decision of the Springfield
Court of Appeals, plaintiff sued for damages to his automobile caused by a collision
with defendant's train at a public crossing. Defendant pleaded contributory neg-
ligence, bottomed upon plaintiff's failure to stop, look and listen before driving upon
the tracks. Although it appeared that plaintiff's view of the tracks, until within
a few feet of them, was completely obstructed, the court denied defendant's in-
struction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, and left to the jury the ques-
tion whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence under the circum-
stances. Plaintiff had a verdict and judgment, and defendant appealed, alleging that
plaintiff's failure to stop, look and listen convicted him of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The
court said: "Distances, speed, physical facts, and the conduct of the injured party,
together with all the other facts and circumstances, must be taken into consideration
in passing upon the question of contributory negligence. Each case is more or less
different on the facts, and no hard and fast rules may be laid down applicable alike
to all cases".
With respect to the standard of conduct which a traveler must observe in a
crossing case, there is some divergence of judicial opinion in this country. The rule
in Missouri, however, seems to be well settled in accordance with the instant case.2
The courts of this state have uniformly held, in such situations, that the standard
of care which may be exacted from the traveler is that which is characteristic of a
reasonably prudent individual under the circumstances. Except in those cases
where a directed verdict is possible because the evidence conclusively establishes con-
tributory negligence,3 it is always, according to the Missouri decisions, a question
for submission to the jury. The great weight of authority elsewhere is to the same
effect4
But a different rule is followed in a minority of jurisdictiofis. 5 In Pennsylvania,
perhaps, the minority rule has received its greatest impetus and most definite pro-
1. 297 S. W. 463 (1927).
2. Elliott v. Chicago, etc. Ry Co., 105 Mo. App.
523, 80 S. W. 270 (1904); King v. St. Louis, etc.
Ry. Co., 143 Mo. App. 279, 127 S. W. 400 (1910):.
Woodward v. Wabash R. Co., 152 Mo. App. 468, 133
S. W. 677 (1910); Moore v. Wabash Ri. Co., 157 Mo.
App. 53, 137 S. W. 5 (1911); Feldewerth v. Wabash
R. Co., 181 Mo. App. 630, 164 S. W. 711 (1914):
Underwood v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., 182 Mo. App.
252 (1914); Salisbury v. Quincy, etc. R. Co., 268 S. W.
896 (Mo. App.) (1924); Pierson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.,
275 S. W. 561 (Mo. App.) (1925).
3. See Burge v. Wabash R. Co., 244 Mo. 76, 148
S. W. 925 (1912).
4. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hyatt, 151 Ala. 355,
43 So. 867 (1907); Martin v. So. Pac. Ry. Co.. 150 Cal.
124.88 Pat. 701 (1906); E. J. and E. Ry. Co. v. Law-
ler, 229 Il. 621, 82 N. E. 407 (1907); Hartman v.
C. G. W. Ry. Co., 132 Ia. 582, 110 N. W. 10 (1906);
Harwood v. Mo. Pat. Ry. Co., 118 Kan. 332, 234 Pac.
990 (1925); Jenkins v. R. Co., 124 Minn. 368, 145 N.
W. 40 (1914); Hall v. Union Pacific R. Co., 113 Neb.
9, 201 N. W. 678 (1924); Davis v. Concord, etc. Ry.
Co., 68 N. H. 247, 44 At. 388 (1895); Alden Speares
Sons Co. v. B.and M.R. Co., 80 N. H. 243,116 At. 343
(1921); Cowell v. Pa. Ry. Co., 101 N. J. L. 507, 129
At. 136 (1925): Kentficldv. N.Y. C. R. Co.. 206 App.
Div. 540, 199 N. Y. S. 860 (1923); Manning v.
Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 129 S. C. 391, 125 S. E. 31 (1924);
Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. %. Duty, 267 S. W. 744
(Te. Civ. App.) (1924); Payne v. Masan, 123 S. E.
519 (Va.) (1924); Petry v. Hines, 117 Wash. 175,
200 Pa. 1077 (1921). For additional casts sce Cent.
Dig., Railroads, Sem. 1169, 1171, 1174; Dec. and 2nd
Dec. Dig., Railroads, See. 350 (16). 350 (23).
5. C. 1. and P. Ry. Co. v. Hamilton, 92 Ark.
400, 123 S. W. 379 (1909); St. Louis, etc. K. Co. v.
Stacks, 97 Ark. 405, 134 S. W.% 315: St. Louis, etc.
R. Co. v. Coleman, 97 Ark. 438,135 S. W. 338 (1911);
North P. R. Co. v. Heilman, 49 Pa. (A0 (1865); Irey
v.P.R. Co., 132 Pa. 563,19 At. 341 (M);Mostal-
ler v. B. and O. R. Co., 233 Pa.388, 82 At. 462 (1912):
Weike v. P., etc. Ry. Co., 237 Pa. 524, 85 At. 872
(1912): Atlantic Refining Co. v. N. Y. etc. R. Co.
67 Pa. Super. Ct. 320 (1917); White v. Minne3polis,
etc. R. Co., 147 Wis. 141,133 N. W. 148 (1911); Bates
v. San Pedro, 38 Utah 568, 114 Pa. 527 (1911);
Wright v. Clark, 79 Fed. 744,25 C. C. A. 190 (Utah
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nouncement, and the minority rule will therefore, for convenience, be referred to
herein as the Pennsylvania rule. In Pennsylvania, and the states which have a
similar doctrine, the standard ofconduct is not so flexible as in Missouri. In Atlantic
Refining Co. v. A. Y., Chicago and St. L. R. R. Co.,6 the court said: "The rule to
stop, look and listen is not a rule of evidence, but a rule of law, peremptory, absolute,
and unbending, and the jury can never be permitted to ignore it, or to pare it away
by distinction and exception". It is, in Pennsylvania, an absolute and unbending rule
that a traveler upon the public highway must stop, look and listen before he enters
upon the railroad crossing. If he has done this, and thenproceeds, the question wheth
er or not he has exercised proper care in crossing the tracks, as he proceeds, and
whether it is necessary for him to stop again, is a question for the jury.? But if le
fails to stop, look and listen before he goes onto the tracks, he is thereby convicted
of negligence, and, no matter what the other circumstances, he cannot recover.
Except in Pennsylvania and the jurisdictions which follow it, this obligation
to stop, look and listen before crossing a railroad is not absolute. To be sure, the
duty to look and listen is so proper a precaution, in most cases, as to be frequently
mentioned in terms which, standing alone, might be interpreted to imply an absolute
duty; but the general rule is undoubtedly in accord with that promulgated by the
Missouri decisions. 8 Even in Missouri, if an automobilist's view at a crossing is
obstructed in such a manner that he can neither see nor hear an approaching train,
it may become his duty, in the exercise of ordinary care, to stop his car in a place of
safety, to ascertain, before driving into the danger zone, whether a train is near at
hand.
A possible third and intermediate view seems to have been adopted by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in the recent decision of Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Good-
man'. In that case the plaintiff's intestate was driving an automobile truck in an east-
erly direction and was killed by defendant's train running southwesterly across the
road at a rate of not less than sixty miles per hour. The line was straight, but the
driver "had no practical view" beyond a section house 243 feet north of the crossing
until he was about 20 feet from the tracks. He had been driving at the rate of 10
or 12 miles per hour but in going onto the crossing cut down his rate to 5 or 6 miles
per hour. The plaintiff had judgment below, and the same was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment,
the error adjudged being the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict for the de-
fendant. Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "When a man
goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a place where he will be killed if
a train comes upon him before he is clear of the track. He knows that he must stop
for the train, not the train for him. In such circumstances it seems to us that if a
driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near, he must stop and
get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than
to stop and look. It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the train or any
signal and takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk. It is true that the
question of due care very generally isleft to the jury. But we are dealing with a stand-
ard of conduct, and when the standard is clear, it should be laid down once for all
by the courts". The necessity of stopping would apparently extend, according to
this decision, only to those cases where a view of the tracks is rendered impossible by
reason of obstructions flanking the road. The case does not seem to go the full
length of the Pennsylvania decisions.
6. 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 320 (1917). 73 At. 940 (1909); Benner v. P., etc. Ry. Co., 262 Pa.
7. Lehigh V. R. Co. v. Braidmaier, 113 Pa. 610 307, 105 At. 283 (1918).
(1886); Kinter v. Pa. Ry. Co., 204 Pa. 497, 54 At. 276 8. See notes 4 and S.
(1903); Bistider v. Lehigh V. R. Co., 224 Pa. 615, 9. 48 S. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed. (Adv. 22), (1927).
NOTES ON MISSOURI CASES
What are the-relative merits of the foregoing rules?
If the rule followed by the Pennsylvania courts be adopted, presumably
railroads would seldom be liable for crossing accidents. The duty imposed on the
traveler is so extreme that if he performs it he is almost certain to get across safely.
Perhaps the rule is supposed to work toward the protection of human lives. However,
human beings are, and probably may be expected to remain, human beings. A man is
not likely to use more caution than he thinks necessary under the circumstances.
It is improbable that a stringent rule of law (and certainly if he has no knowledge of
it) will make him act differently from the way he would have responded under a
more lenient rule. In Murphy v. W/abash Railroad Co.,1o Judge Lamm remarks:
"It may well be doubted if a single person, within the memory of man now alive,
ever walked on a railroad track in Missouri, or refrained from walking there, solely
because of any decision made by this or any court on any phase of the law of negli-
gence". The Judge's remarks have the flavor of good sense. They apply to a crossing
case with equal reason. It may well be doubted, therefore, whether the enforcement
of the Pennsylvania rule would result in the prevention of crossing accidents and the
consequent saving of life.
The application of the Pennsylvania rule might well tend to laxness on the
part of the railroads. Certainly the feeling of security on their behalf which the rule
must engender, would not naturally stimulate additional effort toward the abolition
of accidents.
If the object of the particular rule be the stimulation of greater care and the
consequent decrease in accidents, it would seem that more might be accomplished
along this line by putting a greater burden on the railroad, rather than on the traveler;
for a railroad corporation informs itself of the rule of law, and seeks to come within it,
whereas an injured traveler would in all likelihood learn of the rule for the first time
when he consulted his lawyer after the accident.
It is argued that as the automobile is a heavy and powerful machine, a higher
degree of care should be observed at grade crossings by the driver than in the case of
ordinary horse-drawn vehicles, not only for the safety of the occupants of the car, but
for the safety of the train and its passengers as well. But it seems that this circum-
stance is adequately taken account of under the Missouri rule, by reason of the fact
that the character of the vehicle enters into the question whether the driver was in
the exercise of due care under the circumstances.
Justice Holmes, in his book on "The Common Law" (1SS1) (pp. 12-129)
stated with much force probably the strongest argument in favor of the stringent
rule. He says:
"But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that
the court is to go leaving the standard to thejury forever? Is it not manifest, on the
contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole, as fair a tribunal as it is represented to be,
the lesson which can be got from that source will be learned? Either the court will
find that the fair teaching of experience is that the conduct complained of usually
is or is not blameworthy, and therefore, unless explained, is or is not a ground of
liability; or it will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the necessity of
making up its mind for itself. There is no reason why any such question should not
be settled ......... The exceptions would mainly be found where the standard was rap-
idly changing....The trouble with many cases of negligence is, that they are of a kind
not frequently recurring, so as to enable any given judge to profit by long experience
with juries to lay down rules, and that the elements are so complex that courts are
glad to leave the whole matter in a lump for the jury's determination."
10. 228 Mo. 56, 128 S. W. 481 (1910).
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The position of Justice Holmes is, therefore, that the state of facts embraced within
an ordinary crossing accident case has been so frequently repeated as to justify
laying down an arbitrary standard of conduct, failure to live up to which shall
constitute negligence as a matter of law.
However it is difficult to perceive why the arbitrary standard, if it is to be es-
tablished, should apply only in cases where the traveler's view is obstructed. The po-
sition taken byHolmes in "The Common Law" would seem to lead him to the Penn-
sylvania rule.
We confess to a preference for the orthodox rule of the Missouri court. There
seems to be no sound reason why a different rule should be enforced in crossing
accident cases than that which prevails in all other actions grounded upon negligence
and in which contributory negligence is available as a defense. The hard and fast
rule, as enunciated in Pennsylvania, or as promulgated in its modified form by the
Supreme Court of the United States, would seem to work a judicial usurpation of the
function of the jury. There are conceivable cases in which the person injured might
justifiably go upon the crossing without pausing to stop, look and listen; as, for ex-
ample, when a flagman invites him to cross,11 or where there is an implied invitation
by reason of the opening of gates,12 or where there is a flagman who makes no signal
though he sees the oncoming traveler.13
Furthermore, fairness seems to dictate that railroad and traveler be subjected
to reciprocal rights and obligations. The Supreme Court of the United States has
not always been of the opinion that the entire burden should be placed upon one
party to the exclusion of the other. In Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead 4 a case
arising from Indiana, a railroad, sued in a crossirig accident case, requested tle
court to charge the jury to the general effect that the plaintiff should have looked out
for the train, and was chargeable with negligence in not having done so; that an
engineer is not bound to look to right or left, but only ahead on the line of the railway,
and has a right to expect that persons and teams will keep out of the way of the loco-
motive; and that it is the duty of those crossing the railroad to listen, and to look
both ways along the railroad before going onto it, and to ascertain whether a train
is approaching or not. The trial judge refused so to instruct. Plaintiff had a verdict
and judgment. Defendant appealed, alleging the refusal of the requested instruction
as error. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. The court says that the obli-
gations, rights, and duties of railroads and travelers.upon intersecting highways are
mutual and reciprocal; that no greater degree of care is required of the one than the
other; that though it cannot be expected that the train will stop and let the traveler
cross first, yet the railroad is bound to give reasonable and timely warning of tlhe
approach of the train, and to slacken speed if necessary, or station watchmen at the
crossing, if, by reason of intervening objects obstructing the view of the traveler, or
otherwise, the railroad cannot otherwise give timely warning. And the traveler,
on the other hand, says the court, is bound to exercise ordinary care and diligence to
ascertain whether a train is approaching; but there is no justification, the court
holds, for putting all the burden on the traveler.
Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead seems preferable to Baltimore and Ohtio
R. Co. v. Goodman.
R. V.
11. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hitt, 76 Ark. 224, 88 (1884).
S. W. 908 (1905); Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Cough, 134 13. Robbins v. Fitchburg R. Co., 161 Mass, 14S,
I11. 586 (1891). 36 N. E. 752 (1894).
12. Conaty v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co., 164 Mass. 572. 14. 95 U S. 161 (1877).
42 N. E. 103 (1895); Slushing v. Sharp, 96 N.Y. 676
